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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
-The Hearst Corp. v. Vanderbilt,'85 motivated by the liberal
approach of the CPLR, as reflected in section 3026, and the
manifest importance of time in the particular case, held that such
defective verification was excusable under the circumstances.
In that case, plaintiff sought a temporary injunction against
picketing pending trial of a claim for a permanent injunction.
Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was
defectively verified, i.e., the attorney who verified did not have
"actual knowledge of portions of the contents." The court ac-
knowledged that "formal application" would require a dismissal
and yet refused to dismiss. The court extended the liberal con-
struction required of pleadings by section 3026 to the defective
verification of a complaint, where there is no substantial prejudice
to the defendant and where, as here, time is of the essence.
This court has further emasculated the already weak veri-
fication process. The value of this decision will not be assessed
here since there is a plethora of information dealing with the
virtues of verification.136  Suffice it to note that now, in addition
to the failure of district attorneys to prosecute for fraudulent
verification, the courts, or at least the court in the instant case,
will ignore a factor basic to verification-knowledge of the facts-
and thus render verification little more than certification.
Answer must be verified as to all but self-incriminatory matter
when complaint has been properly verified.
Another problem of verification arose in the Supreme Court of
Erie County. In Knight v. Maybee 137 the action was one for
damages arising from an accident between a truck, in which
plaintiff was a passenger, and a car operated by defendant. Plain-
tiff's verified complaint alleged that defendant was driving while
drunk and was found guilty of that crime in a criminal
proceeding. 813
Defendant's motion to strike out the paragraphs pertaining
to his conviction was denied. He then served an unverified
answer denying several allegations but remaining silent on those
he found objectionable. Defendant moved to force plaintiff to
accept his answer. In denying defendant's motion, the court
indicated that the defendant must serve an answer verified as to
those matters on which he "would not be privileged from testifying
on the ground of self-incrimination."
13544 Misc. 2d 542, 254 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
1S6For a suggestion that all pleadings be verified see 6 N.Y. JUD.
COUNCIL REP. 46 (1940), 7 N.Y. JuD. CouNcIL Rap. 42-43 (1941). For an
indication that verification has lost most of its value see 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 3020, supp. commentary 72 (1964).
13744 Misc. 2d 152, 253 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
1ss In fact, defendant had an appeal pending from that conviction.
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This case has its significance in the illustration of the differ-
ence between CPLR 3020(a) and its predecessor- Section 248
of the CPA. The wording of section 248 caused the courts to con-
clude that where there was any matter in a complaint to which
defendant was exempt from pleading in his answer (in this case
an incriminating passage regarding defendant's drunken state)
his whole answer did not have to be verified.'39 CPLR 3020(a)
has modified the former provision. The CPLR indicates that where
a pleading is verified all subsequent pleadings must be verified
except "as to matter in the pleading concerning which the party
would be privileged from testifying as a witness." Hence, the
court held that defendant must verify those parts of his pleadings
not referring to his conviction for drunken driving; while under
Section 248 of the CPA the whole answer would not have needed
verification.
CPLR 3013: Demand for equitable relief not fatal to complint if
facts alleged merely show basis for legal relief.
Despite the clear intent of previous code sections to effect a
merger of law and equity, 40 courts seemed reluctant to give full
effect to that purpose. Instead, courts required that a complaint
conform to a "theory of the pleadings," thereby necessitating a
distinction between equity and law actions at the pleading stage.' 4'
While CPLR 103 (a), which is identical with previous code sections
abolishing distinctions between law and equity, 42 could not ac-
complish such change itself, the combined effect of two other
sections, CPLR 3013 and CPLR 3026, is to remove the main
judicial stumbling blocks to the effective merger of law and
equity.
In Lane v. Mercury Record Corp., 43 an action to compel an
accounting of royalties claimed under a recording contract, the
appellate division, affirming, held that a demand for equitable
relief alone was not fatal to the complaint even though it was
determined that plaintiff was entitled only to money damages for
breach of contract. The court found the complaint sufficient ' 44
under CPLR 3013 since the statements were particular enough
to give defendant notice of the transactions intended to be proved
239 "Verification may be omitted . . . where the party . . . would be
privileged from testifying as a witness concerning an allegation or denial
contained in the pleading."
149N.Y. CODE oF Civ. PToc. §62; CPA §8.
141See, e.g., Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 283 N.Y. 299, 28
N.E2d 846 (1940); Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149, 118 N.E. 512 (1917).
142 Supra note 140.
'43 21 App. Div. 2d 602, 252 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1st Dep't 1964).
'"4 See Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Ist
Dep't 1964).
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